

# Web Application Security

An IXP Manager Perspective

Barry O'Donovan


RIPE 92, Edinburgh, Scotland, May 2026

# Why Web Application Security?

# The threat model has changed

- **Now your web portal controls your infrastructure**
  - Route server configs, member data, automated provisioning
- **The attack surface has grown**
  - Public web apps, APIs, member self-service, *and staff*
- **More than “just” a defaced webpage**
  - Path to production systems
  - NIS2 raise the bar and regulatory attention

# Web Application Security Fundamentals



OWASP includes details on how to prevent and examples – essential reading.

- <https://owasp.org/Top10/2025/>

# IXP Manager

# IXP Manager

- Free & Open-Source Software Platform for IXPs
  - <https://www.ixpmanager.org/>
- Teaches and implements best practice
- Mature – created pre-2005, open-sourced 2010

# IXP Manager – Community Statistics

**14,299**

Connected Networks

**493 Tbps**

Connected Capacity

**20,869**

Connected Ports

There are at least **262** IXPs Powering Peering using IXP Manager around the world to connect **14,299** networks of which **8,020** are unique. The edge peering capacity of these networks is **493 Tbps** over **20,869** connected ports. We aggregate traffic statistics from 154 IXP Manager platforms which show us that the peak traffic exchanged is **114.94 Tbps**.

# The Challenge of Legacy

- **20 years of accumulated decisions**
  - Past assumptions need regular revisiting. Acceptable 2010; risk in 2026.
  - Technical debt compounds
- **Rewriting isn't realistic**
  - Incremental improvements while keeping production running
- **Framework upgrades are hard**
  - PHP, Laravel, and dependencies must move together
- **Success raises the stakes**
  - 262+ IXPs means higher security expectations

# The Challenge of Legacy

2005 - PHP4/Pear/Perl

2007 - ZF1/Doctrine ORM1/Smarty

2012 – ZF1/Doctrine ORM2/Smarty

2015-9 - Laravel, Doctrine, Foil

2021 – Laravel, Foil

# The Challenge of Legacy – Layer defences


- CI pipeline with static code analysis and unit testing
- Supply chain security via dependency scanning
- Penetration testing
- ISMS: Secure Application Development Policy
- GitHub: 2fa enforced, branch protection, secret scanning

*We're not claiming perfection.*

*We are committed to continuous improvement.*

# Independent Security Assessments

# Web Application Pen Tests of IXP Manager



# Pen Test: 2022 NCC Group



v6.3.0 - Security hardening, with various improvements ...



Mostly “was grand in the past,  
not now” issues

Some XSS issues

User enumeration via forgotten password

Enforce a (stronger) password policy

Disable phpinfo() by default

# Pen Test: 2023 GRNET



v6.3.1 - XSS Security Fixes, Small Bug Fixes ...



Five XSS issues

4 required admin access

1 potentially non-admin user, no PoC

# Pen Test: 2024 NCC Group



Mostly advisory / “by design” – some under review



DocStore - uploaded file types not restricted – only admins can upload files.

A couple implementation specific issues – advice provided

# 2026 ENISA Penetration Test

# ENISA Cybersecurity Support Action

- **ENISA** - European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
- **2022 - Cybersecurity Support Action Programme**
  - Support Member States reinforce their preparedness (ex-ante), and response (ex-post) capabilities.
- Ireland's NCSC oversaw this program in Ireland
- Invited DigiCORE members to submit applications
- INEX submitted IXP Manager for the web application penetration test service

# Beneficiaries

- **INEX**
- **~60 EU IXPs**
- **>260 worldwide**



# The Assessment

- **Seven-day web application pen test**
  - Conducted in February 2026 on v7.0.1
  - Grey-box methodology
  - Combination of AI and human
- **Performed by independent professionals**
  - S2 Grupo

# Results & Remediation

- **3 medium-risk, 1 low-risk vulnerability [CVSS]**
  - Unsecured input – Persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) [6.7]
  - Lack of Headers – X-Frame-Options and CSP [5.3]
  - User Enumeration via Differentiated HTTP Responses [5.3]
  - Information Disclosure – Error messages [2.7]
- **Most issues have been addressed in v7.2**
  - Content Security Policy requires research

## [VULN-02] Lack of Headers: X-Frame-Options and Content Security Policy

*The X-Frame-Options header allowed specifying whether a frame or iframe was permitted to embed the web content. Websites could use it to prevent clickjacking attacks by ensuring their content was not embedded in other sites.*

```
<Directory /srv/ixpmanager/public>  
Header Set X-Frame-Options "DENY"
```

# Post Penetration Test Work

## V7.1: Securing Administrative Functions

- Publicly accessible by design
  - Creates unique security challenges
  - Probably not feasible in the medium term?
- V7.1 introduced a /admin prefix for admin-only functions.
  - Protect access to at the web server level
  - Reduces the potential attack surface by 72%

**Only useful if you implement this!**

## V7.2: Additional Security Fixes

- ENISA's work inspired our new developer (Thomas Kerin)
  - Developed an innovative XSS catcher
  - Concentrated on XSS execution rather than injection
  - Updated many templates
  - No known PoCs/exploits
- URL building via string concatenation replaced
  - Laravel's URL builder ensures variable input is sanitised.

# Key Takeaways

- **Web application security is everyone's responsibility**
  - Whether you use IXP Manager or your own system
- **Invest in independent security assessments**
  - EU programmes like ENISA's can help fund this
- **Adopt a secure development lifecycle**
  - ISMS, OWASP, CI, responsible disclosure, supply chain security
- **Keep frameworks and dependencies current**
- **Upgrade to IXP Manager v7.2**

# Our Sponsors



G  
O  
L  
D



**Berlin Commercial  
Internet Exchange**



NORWEGIAN INTERNET EXCHANGE

S  
I  
L  
V  
E  
R



B  
R  
O  
N  
Z  
E



**Thank you.**