

IXP Manager & Route Servers



Route Servers Video Tutorial Series - Part 6

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Securing Route Servers with RPKI and IXP Manager

Demonstration

- [x] Build the route server
- [x] Show clients connected and routes
- [x] IPv6 instance
- [x] Looking glass
- [x] Community filtering
- [x] IRRDB filtering
- [] RPKI filtering

RRPKI

RPKI Filtering

- An IRRDB entry was a prefix and an origin ASN
- RPKI is a cryptographically secure replacement
 - Adds maximum prefix length
- Yields route origin triplets that have been validated

```
( Origin AS, Prefix, Max Length )  
( AS65500, 2001:db8::/32, /48 )  
( AS65501, 192.0.2.0/24, /24 )
```

RPKI Validators

An RPKI Validator (aka Relying Party software- **rely: depend on with full trust**) downloads and verifies the global RPKI data set and can be used to feed the resultant data to our route servers.

- NLnetLabs Routinator
- Cloudflare's OctoRPKI
- FORT Validator, OpenBSD's rpki-client, rpki-prover, RPSTIR2

RPKI and IXP Manager

1. You need **two** RPKI validators
 - See <https://docs.ixpmanager.org/features/rpki/>
2. Add simple config to IXP Manager's `.env`:

```
# IP address and port of the first RPKI local cache:  
IXP_RPKI_RTR1_HOST=192.168.140.211  
IXP_RPKI_RTR1_PORT=3323
```
3. Enable RPKI for the router(s) in IXP Manager

RPKI and Origin ASNs

- RPKI provides a prefix and an origin AS
- It **does not** provide any information about whether a particular peer **should** be able to advertise such a prefix and origin ASN
- E.g. if a peer accidentally advertised a Netflix prefix with Netflix's ASN as the origin, it would pass RPKI's test!
- **You cannot have RPKI without the IRRDB origin AS check**

RPKI Filtering and IXP Manager

We had:

```
# IRRDB origin ASN check
```

```
...
```

```
# Skipping RPKI check -> RPKI not enabled / configured correctly.  
bgp_large_community.add( IXP_LC_INFO_RPKI_NOT_CHECKED );
```

```
# IRRDB prefix check
```

RPKI Filtering and IXP Manager

We now have:

```
# IRRDB origin ASN check
```

```
...
```

```
# RPKI test - if it's INVALID or VALID, we are done  
if filter_rpki() then accept;
```

```
# IRRDB prefix check
```

RPKI Filtering and IXP Manager

```
function filter_rpki()  
{  
    if( roa_check( t_roa, net, bgp_path.last_nonaggregated ) = ROA_INVALID ) then {  
        bgp_large_community.add( IXP_LC_FILTERED_RPKI_INVALID );  
        return true;  
    }  
  
    if( roa_check( t_roa, net, bgp_path.last_nonaggregated ) = ROA_VALID ) then {  
        bgp_large_community.add( IXP_LC_INFO_RPKI_VALID );  
        return true;  
    }  
  
    bgp_large_community.add( IXP_LC_INFO_RPKI_UNKNOWN );  
    return false;  
}
```

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Recap on "Securing Route Servers"

1. Small prefixes (default is $> /24$ for ipv4 and $/48$ for ipv6)
2. Martians / bogons
3. Ensure at least 1 ASN and ≤ 64 ASNs in path
4. Ensure peer AS is the same as first AS in the prefix's AS path
5. Prevent next-hop hijacking
6. Filter known transit networks
7. Ensure origin AS is in set of ASNs from member AS-SET
8. RPKI:
 - Valid -> accept
 - Invalid -> drop
 - Unknown -> revert to standard IRRDB prefix filtering

Thanks for watching!

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